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Case No. 20090784-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, HAROLD VAN ADAMS and/or 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Labor Commission 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The petition for review of this workers' compensation claim is taken from the 
Labor Commission's Order Amending ALJfs Decision and Affirming Denial of Benefits 
issued on August 28, 2009. R. 185-89. The order concluded, contrary to the decision of 
the administrative law judge (ALJ), that petitioner was an independent contractor, not an 
employee, of respondent Adams, but affirmed the ALJ!s determination that petitioner is 
not entitled to benefits because any working relationship between petitioner and Mr. 
Adams had ended before the time of the accident. Petitioner filed a timely petition for 
review of the Commission's order on September 25, 2009. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 2009) gives this Court jurisdiction over "the final orders and 
decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies." 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Did the Labor Commission reasonably conclude that petitioner was an 
independent contractor, not respondent Adams' employee? 
Standard of Review: "Because the Legislature has vested the Labor Commission 
(the Commission) with a great deal of discretion concerning matters involving workers' 
compensation, we will reverse the Commission's decisions only if they are unreasonable 
or irrational." Gates v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 428 at *1, 2002 WL 31839167 .* 
See also Osman Home Improvement v. Indus. Comm'n, 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah App. 
1998) ("In applying [an intermediate] standard [of review], we determine whether the 
agency decision exceeded '"the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'") (quoting 
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 
(Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted)). To the extent that petitioner challenges the 
Commission's underlying factual findings, they "will be affirmed so long as they are 
supported by substantial evidence, 'in light of the whole record.' So long as the findings 
are supported by substantial evidence, we will not overturn them 'even if another 
conclusion from the evidence is permissible.'" Gates, 2002 UT App 428 at * 1 (quoting 
Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998) (internal citation omitted; 
quotations and citation omitted in original)). 
Unpublished decisions of this Court are binding precedential authority. Grand 
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, % 16, 44 P.3d 734; see also Utah R. App. P. 30(f). 
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2. Assuming, only for purposes of argument, that petitioner was an employee of 
Mr. Adams, did his claimed injury occur in the course of his employment, for purposes of 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) (West 2004)? 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court has held that whether an employee 
is within the course of employment for purposes of the Workers1 Compensation Act "is a 
mixed question of law and fact." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT 4, 
% 13, 153 P.3d 179 (analyzing liability under the coming-and-goi^ig rule). "Agency 
decisions that apply the law to facts are entitled to discretion and 'are [only] subject to 
judicial review to assure that they fall within the limits of reasonableness and rationality.1" 
Allen v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT App 186, % 6, 112 
P.3d 1238 (quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 
(Utah 1983) (alteration in original)). "In contrast, we will overturn an agency's factual 
findings only if they are fnot supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court.1" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) 
(1997)).2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
2The identical statutory language is now found at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) (West 2009). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Petitioner filed his application for hearing in this case on February 6, 2006, 
seeking workers1 compensation benefits for an injury allegedly sustained in an industrial 
accident occurring on December 26, 2005. R. 1-2. The case was heard by an 
administrative law judge, who denied benefits. The ALJ ruled that petitioner was an 
employee of respondent Adams, but concluded that the employment relationship was 
terminated on December 23, 2005, and that the accident causing the alleged injury took 
place neither within the time and space boundaries of the employment nor in the course of 
an activity related to the employment. R. 126-32. 
Petitioner moved for review by the Utah Labor Commission. R. 133-46. The 
Commission adopted the ALTs findings of fact, but, contrary to the ALJfs determination, 
concluded that petitioner was an independent contractor, not an employee, and was not 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits for this reason. The Commission agreed, 
however, that even if petitioner had established that he was Mr. Adams' employee, he 
would still not be entitled to benefits because any employment relationship had ended by 
the time of the accident. R. 185-89; 187 n.2. Petitioner then sought review in this Court. 
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B. Statement of Relevant Facts3 
Respondent Adams owns certain rental properties in Midyale, Utah. R. 127. Mark 
Warburton collects rent on the properties from the tenants for Mr. Adams. He is also the 
person tenants contact if repairs are needed, and the person who contacts repairmen to 
perform the repairs. R. 127 n.l. On November 22, 2005, Mr. Warburton offered to pay 
petitioner $1,500 to "fix up" three vacant, vandalized apartments, an amount that included 
both labor and supplies. R. 127, 185-86. The project required petitioner to remove 
garbage; rake leaves; repair drywall, plumbing, and furnaces; and-perform sandblasting. 
R. 127 n.l, 186. Petitioner stated that he could complete the project in three to four days. 
R. 127. He used his own truck and tools, including his own air compressor. R. 128, 186. 
Some cleaning supplies and a trailer to haul away trash were made available for his use. 
R. 128, 186. 
On November 27, 2005, Mr. Warburton visited the apartments and became upset 
by the lack of progress on the project. At that time, petitioner presented him with receipts 
for work and material that exceeded the agreed $1,500 budget, k. 186. Mr. Warburton 
then left town for approximately one week. On his return, petitioner gave him a summary 
ofwork time and receipts totaling approximately $4,500. R. 123, 186. On December 6, 
2005, Mr. Warburton and Mr. Adams surveyed the project, which was still incomplete, 
Respondent Uninsured Employers Fund (UEF) notes that petitionees statement of 
facts is replete with references to his own testimony contradicting the facts as found by 
the ALJ and the Commission. UEF submits that the relevant facts are those found by the 
Commission, adopting the ALJfs findings-not petitioner's testimony to the contrary. 
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and met with petitioner. Mr. Adams gave petitioner a check for $4,000 and told petitioner 
to wrap up the job. Petitioner responded that he would finish in one day. R. 128, 186. 
Mr. Warburton developed pneumonia and was unable to visit the site for the next 
ten days. On December 23, 2006, Mr. Adams visited the property, and petitioner asked 
for an additional $9,800. Mr. Adams refused, pointed out petitioner's shoddy 
workmanship, and ordered petitioner off the property. Petitioner threatened Mr. Adams 
physically, collected his tools, and left. R. 128, 186. 
Petitioner returned to the job site on December 26, 2005, with a third party to 
retrieve his air compressor, and allegedly injured his back helping to lift the compressor 
into his truck-an injury he first reported to his doctor over one month later. R. 129, 186. 
In subsequent correspondence with Mr. Warburton, he threatened to file a civil lawsuit 
and to make a report to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. R. 124, 128. 
On January 12, 2006, he filed a mechanic's lien against the property in the amount of 
$8,907.32. R. 122, 128. On February 13, 2006, he wrote to Mr. Adams, informing him 
of the injury and again threatening suit. R. 125, 128. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The ALJ and the Commission, while agreeing on the facts underlying petitioner's 
claim to employee status, disagreed on the result: the Commission, unlike the ALJ, 
concluded that petitioner was an independent contractor, not an employee. Petitioner 
points to the conflict between his and respondents1 testimony to support his claim of 
employee status. However, in determining whether the Commission's decision is 
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supported by substantial evidence, this Court "will not substitute its judgment as between 
two reasonably conflicting views, even though we may have come to a different 
conclusion had the case come before us for de novo review." Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of 
Review, 116 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). Moreover, petitioner has not scrupulously 
marshaled the evidence supporting the facts that underlie the Commission's decision, as 
he is required to do. Gates, 2002 UT App 428 at *1 . Because there is substantial 
evidence of record supporting the Commission's decision, it falls within the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality, and there is no basis to disturb it. 
Even if the Court were to rule that he was an employee, petitioner has failed to 
counter the substantial evidence that any working relationship ended days before his 
claimed injury. While he argues that respondents1 testimony on this issue is self-serving, 
he acknowledges that the parties had a "falling out" on December 23, 2005, the date that 
marked the end of the relationship under both the ALJfs and the Commission's analysis. 
He also fails to recognize that his own testimony-and his self-generated written summary 
showing that he worked for several hours on December 26, 2005, the date of the alleged 
accident-are equally self-serving. As with the first issue, the substantial evidence 
standard requires affirmance of the Commission's decision between plausible alternative 
views of the evidence. 
Petitioner's contention that any doubt must be resolved in favor of compensation 
cannot be sustained in light of the applicable standard of review. Because the 
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Commission's decision, as supported by substantial evidence of record, falls within the 
limits of reasonableness and rationality, it warrants this Court's affirmance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S 
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER WAS AN INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE 
"Substantial evidence is 'more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence ... though 
"something less than the weight of the evidence.'"" Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 
(quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) 
(quoting Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)); see also Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, U 35, 164 P.3d 
384 (quoting Grace Drilling). "An administrative law decision meets the substantial 
evidence test when 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate' the evidence supporting 
the decision." Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at % 35 (quoting Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). So long as the Commission^ conclusion 
that petitioner was an independent contractor is based on evidence a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support it, petitioner's disagreement with the result is not a 
basis for reversal. And nothing in petitioner's argument forecloses the reasonable 
conclusion drawn by the Commission: that he was not an employee of respondent 
Adams. R. 187. 
The Commission began its analysis by referring to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-103(7)(a) (West 2004), noting that, under the statute, an employer who retains 
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supervision and control over the work performed by a contractor is considered the 
contractor's employer if the "work is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer."4 It then examined a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to control, as 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 
P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1986), including the extent of actual supervision of the worker, the 
method of payment, the furnishing of equipment, and the right to terminate the worker. 
Applying these factors, the Commission concluded that petitioner "acted as an 
independent contractor and was not an employee of Mr. Van Adams." R. 187. It 
observed specifically that "the work Mr. Norris performed was not fpart or process in the 
trade or business1" of Mr. Adams1 rental enterprise-a conclusion petitioner has not 
contested. R. 187. 
A. Part or Process in the Trade or Business 
Although petitioner does not directly address the Commission's conclusion that his 
work was not a part or process in Mr. Adams1 rental business, the issue was addressed in a 
case he cites. In Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 562 P.2d 227 (Utah 
1977), a drywall applicator was held to be an employee of a lodge where he installed 
drywall for a storage area and a conference room ceiling. There are significant 
distinctions between the facts of Rustler Lodge and those of the present case. Relevant to 
the issue of whether the work was a part or process in the trade or business, the Rustler 
4The same language is contained in the current codification of the statute at Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2009). 
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Lodge court found "that the lodge regularly employed maintenance and handy men and 
[the drywall applicator] in fact acknowledged that they were engaged in the performance 
of light construction activity about the lodge at the same time in question," Rustler 
Lodge, 562 P.2d at 229. Given the fact that the lodge "conducts its own maintenance and 
repairs with a handyman crew hired for that purpose," id. at 228, the court had no 
difficulty concluding "that the services performed by [the drywall applicator] were in the 
same nature of maintenance and repairs being carried on by other employees of the lodge 
and hence a part or process of the trade or business of the lodge." -Id. at 229. 
By contrast, petitioner names no other employees of respondent Adams1 rental 
business, let alone employees who were regularly engaged in the business of restoring 
vandalized rental units. In fact, Mr. Warburton testified that maintenance issues were 
routinely handled by outside contractors: "[W]eVe hired Carpet One for the carpet, we 
hire the plumber for the plumbing. These guys come and in in [sic] there - they just do 
the work. We got a leaky toilet. Okay, let me come and fix it. This carpet needs 
replaced. Carpet One comes and replaces it." R. 191 at 143:8-13. Petitioner has 
identified no evidence showing that respondent Adams had any employees at all, let alone 
employees who performed the same work that he did. 
B. Method of Payment 
Rustler Lodge is distinguishable on another basis. In that case, it was agreed that 
the drywall applicator "would be paid at the hourly rate of $8." 562 P.2d at 228. 
Although petitioner claims he was to be paid $40 per hour, neither the ALJ nor the 
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Commission credited his testimony on this point. R. 127 ("Mr. Warburton informed 
Petitioner that the budget for fixing up the apartments was $1,500.00 which included 
Petitioner's wage and services and supplies.") (footnote omitted); 186 n.l ("The 
Commission notes Mr. Norris testified that he was offered $40 an hour to complete the 
project. However, after reviewing the evidentiary record, the Commission finds the other 
testimony more credible.").5 
It is telling that petitioner admits in his brief that "the projected budget for the 
Holden Street repairs was $1500.00." Aplt. Brief at 18.6 In addition, both Mr. Warburton 
and respondent Adams testified that the budget for the entire project was $1,500. R. 191 
at 108:24- 109:11, 109:16-21, 135:17-23, 141:1-7, 142:17, 165:1-3, 166:1-2, 183:8-12. 
Mr. Warburton also explicitly denied-twice-that he ever agreed to pay petitioner by the 
hour. R. 191 at 119:10-18, 140:7-8. He explained how the agreement to the $1,500 
budget came about: 
Petitioner complains that "[t]he Commission however never specifies what that 
'other testimony1 was, but presumably it was the alleged $1500.00 budget for the needed 
repairs." Aplt. Brief at 18. Respondent Uninsured Employers1 Fund observes that it is 
petitioner's burden to "marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68; see 
also Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at f 17, Gates, 2002 UT App 428 at *1. The Court has 
discretion to decline to review the Commission's factual finding based on petitioner's 
failure to marshal. Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at f 19. 
6This admission is particularly revealing in light of petitioner's hearing testimony 
that he was unaware of the $1,500 budget until he confronted respondent Adams several 
weeks after receiving a check for $4,000 on December 6, 2005. R. 191 at 96:24 - 97:11. 
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A I borrowed a dolly from Mr. Norris back in probably November time 
frame of last year and he was asking for the dolly. And I used the dolly to 
move a refrigerator. I went to the apartments and there was four apartments 
that were vandalized. Rick Norris was calling about his dolly. I said come 
over here and get it, and when you get over here I'll show you something. 
These apartments got thrashed. That's how the whole thing started. He 
came over and picked up his dolly and looked in the four units that were 
vandalized and that's where the whole-the whole thing started where, you 
know, "Mark, I can help you fix these if you want. I'm a handyman kind of 
thing." And that's where I called Van and asked him what the budge[t] was 
for this. I told Rick Norris in person that the budget was $ 1,500, to go 
ahead and see if we could get these apartments fixed. And what that meant 
was painted, patching the holes, sanding, maybe those kinds of things to get 
it back to rentable conditions. 
Q Did the $1,500 include Rick's salary as well or Rick's payment as 
well? 
A $1,500 was the budget for the total project. Period. 
R. 191 at 108:12 - 109:7. He further testified that petitioner agreed to those terms: "I 
said we have a budget. If you can do it within his budget, do it. If he can't, don't do it. 
That's basically how it started. 'Oh, I need some Christmas money. I'll do it for that.' 
That's exactly how it was done." R. 191 at 112:22 - 113:1. 
Another indication that respondent Adams did not agree to pay petitioner by the 
hour is the projected completion time for the project. Although petitioner testified that 
Mr. Warburton told him to turn in a time sheet every two weeks "[a]t the very beginning 
when we first started[,]" R. 191 at 79:8, he had previously testified to telling Mr. 
Warburton that the project could be completed in three or four days: 
A You know, there was a conversation when we first got started and 
that. I remember him saying something to the effect, you know, how long 
this is going to take and then I says, you know-I can't remember but it was 
short time. It might have been four days or three days or something along 
those lines. 
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R. 191 at 77:5-10. A projected completion date of three to four days is inconsistent with 
petitioner's subsequent claim that, from the outset, he was to keep track of his hours and 
turn in time sheets every two weeks-a period four times petitioner's own estimate of the 
project's duration. It is, however, consistent with an agreement to pay a fixed sum for a 
fixed result: restoration of the apartments to a rentable state. Petitioner's testimony that 
he anticipated completing the project within a three-to-four-day period also casts doubt on 
the credibility and accuracy of plaintiff s self-generated time sheet documents. See 
R. 76-115. In fact, Mr. Warburton testified that he had never seen the alleged time sheets 
contained in petitioner's Exhibit P-2, and that petitioner did not present the time sheet 
summary contained in petitioner's Exhibit P-1 until he and Mr. Adams met with him on 
December 6, 2005. R. 191 at 120:8 - 121:227 
Although petitioner neglected his burden to marshal the evidence supporting the 
Commission's finding that he was to be paid $1,500 to complete the project of 
rehabilitating the rental units, there is substantial evidence of record that a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support it. The Court need not reach petitioner's 
argument on this point in light of his failure to marshal. But even if the Court chooses to 
consider it, the substantial record evidence in support of the finding requires that it be 
sustained. 
7Mr. Warburton's testimony clearly distinguishes between the daily time sheets 
presented as Exhibit P-2 and the time sheet summary presented as Exhibit P-1. However, 
Mr. Warburton became confused and erroneously referred to Exhibit P-1, the summary he 
acknowledged having seen, as Exhibit P-2. See R. 191 at 121:20-22. 
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C. Extent of Actual Supervision 
As direct evidence of respondent's right to control the work, petitioner asserts that 
the ALJ found "that Mr. Warburton was frequently on the job site." Aplt. Brief at 15. An 
examination of both the ALJfs and the Commission's orders belies petitioner's statement. 
The ALJ noted that after petitioner agreed to fix up the rental units on November 22, 
2005, Mr. Warburton visited the rental units on the Sunday after Thanksgiving 
(November 27, 2005) and then left town on December 1, returning with respondent 
Adams to meet with petitioner again on December 6, 2005. Afterihat meeting, Mr. 
Warburton developed pneumonia and did not visit the rental site for ten days. On his 
recovery, he visited the property once a week. On December 23, Mr. Adams visited the 
site and ordered petitioner off the property. R. 127-28. Simple calculation shows that 
Mr. Warburtonfs visits between the time of petitionees engagement on November 22 and 
his termination on December 23 numbered no more than three.8 The Commission's order 
sets out a similar time line, showing Mr. Warburton visiting the property on November 27 
and December 6, when he became bedridden for ten days, and thereafter visiting once a 
week until December 23. As the Commission concluded, "This minimal interaction did 
not amount to any form of supervision over Mr. Norris." R. 187. Petitioner's brief does 
8If Mr. Warburton visited on December 6, 2005, and was bedridden for the next 
ten days, he would have been unable to visit until at least December 16. Given that 
petitioner was ordered off the property on December 23, 2005, there could have been only 
one "weekly" visit after Mr. Warburton's bout with pneumonia but before petitioner was 
terminated from working on the project. 
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not take issue with the ALJ's or Commission's findings as to the dates of Mr. Warburton's 
visits, but simply recharacterizes them as frequent. He provides no legal authority 
supporting that recharacterization. See Aplt. Brief at 15-16. 
D. Right to Control the Work v. Autonomy 
Contrary to petitioner's implication, the ALJ (and the Commission, by adopting the 
ALJfs findings) did not conclude that petitioner's work was performed exclusively at 
respondent's and Mr. Warburton's direction; rather, the ALJ stated that f,[o]n Mr. 
Warburton's instruction or consent,, Petitioner boarded up windows, changed locks, 
replaced thermostats, repaired drywall, a pothole, a gutter spout and a toilet handle, 
boarded up windows, tore out carpeting, determined where leaks occurred and purchased 
cheap cleaning supplies and paint." R. 128 (emphasis added). The fact that Mr. 
Warburton consented to certain work proposed by petitioner emphasizes that petitioner 
exercised a substantial degree of autonomy in selecting the activities he deemed 
appropriate to the job of preparing the units for rental. As Mr. Warburton testified, 
"Yeah, he had his own truck, had his own tools and, you know, it's like this is the project, 
finish it. See you later, have a nice day. And then that was it." R. 191 at 142:6-8. He 
further explained, "Well, I think what we talked about me and Rick were in together and 
we talked about what needed to be done, and the objective was to get them [the 
apartments] rentable. Period. Can you do it for this amount, yes or no? Yes, I can. That 
was it." R. 191 at 146:2-5. 
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Mr. Warburton also stated that petitioner was "the one that kept adding little 
things. fHey, Mark, this is this, and I found this, I found this, I found that, I found this/" 
R. 191 at 146:9-11. He provided an example of petitioner's control over the way the 
project proceeded: 
Q Did you ask Mr. Norris to repair a furnace in apartment number 
four? 
A No, thatfs-what happened there was Rick tore out the hallway in that 
area and he said I'm just removing the sheet rock and replacing the patch. 
He took out the whole hallway, including the furnace at the end of the 
hallway. I remember asking him why did you tear the furnace out? You 
didn't need to tear the furnace out. "Well, yeah, I don't do-I do things the 
right way and whatever." I says, you know, now after you patch this and 
now that you're done with the job Fm going to have to hire a furnace guy to 
come in and put it in here. "Oh, I can do it, I can do it, I can do it." It was 
never done and we had to hire a furnace guy to come in there and the 
furnace back in and charged us $250 to put the furnace back in. 
R. 191 at 132:4-18. This testimony demonstrates that petitioner, not respondent, was in 
charge of the way in which the job was performed. 
Petitioner's claim that the ALJ found that "[h]e hired painters and other helpers at 
Mr. Warburton's request" is equally unsupported. Aplt. Brief at 16. Scrutiny of the ALJ's 
and the Commission's orders discloses no such finding in either document. Moreover, 
this statement is in direct contradiction to Mr. Warburton's testimony at the hearing before 
the ALJ. Mr. Warburton noted that when he was on the property about once a week, 
"some of the times [petitioner] was there, some of the times he was not. Most of the time 
there was people there, homeless people that he hired were there." R. 191 at 113:15-17. 
When asked if he ever asked petitioner to "hire anybody else," Mr. Warburton responded, 
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"No, I did not." R. 191 at 113:18-19. And when asked if he ever fired one of them, he 
answered, "I never fired anybody." R. 191 at 114:9. He similarly denied hiring "a couple 
of guys that were hanging out around the apartments to help Rick? A guy named Marco 
and a guy named Pedro?" R. 191 at 132:19-21. He responded, 
A I hired nobody. I mean, there was homeless people there. There was 
guys that Rick said, "Oh these homeless people didn't show up so [I] hired 
these two guys instead." Those guys came up there and while Rick was 
working there and asked Rick, "Hey, do you need any help? I'm a handy 
guy." "Well, yeah, and the homeless people didn't show up today, you 
guys can take their spots." That's how the whole thing went out, just like 
that 
Q How do you know? 
A How do I know? He told me. "My guys didn't show up today, but 
these guys came by asking me if I wanted some help and I hired them." I 
says, whatever. And I remember Rick telling me those guys worked all day 
and I paid them but they didn't do anything. And I remember saying why 
did you pay them then? 
R. 191 at 132:22 - 133:11. When asked if he "t[old] Mr. Norris to go hire homeless 
people from the shelter and keep them busy[,]" R. 191 at 134:6-7, Mr. Warburton replied, 
"No. The homeless shelter was his own idea. He painted his own house and he hired 
homeless people for that too. That's what he does. That was his own thing. Whatever he 
did with the homeless shelter or wherever he found these people was not from me." 
R. 191 at 134:8-12. 
Nor did Mr. Warburton ask petitioner to hire painters; instead, Mr. Warburton 
hired them separately, and they did not work under petitioner's supervision. As Mr. 
Warburton explained, 
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[w]ell, we got to the point where I think the project was three weeks 
into it and there was so far from being done. Rick was saying, Fm way over 
budget, I'm way over budget, Fm way over budget. I had a friend that had a 
cousin that does painting. It was around Christmas time, the guyfs from, I 
don't know, he's not from here. He said he would do the painting for us, all 
four units for I think $1,200. So we told the guys to paint them for us since 
it was so far into the project we were behind schedule. 
R. 191 at 115:3-11. As to supervision, Mr. Warburton testified, "I don't think that 
anybody supervised." R. 191 at 115:23-24. He explained that "they came three nights, 
they worked from 5:00 until midnight I think it was unsupervised and they did their own 
thing and when I got there, they were done in three days." R. 19Lat 131:2-4. Unlike the 
labor that petitioner hired to complete his own responsibilities, the painters were outside 
the remaining scope of the project he was engaged to complete. 
Petitioner's autonomy over his own work is amply demonstrated by the record 
evidence. He was engaged to accomplish a general goal: to restore certain apartments to 
rentability. He determined that he could accomplish this goal within a fixed budget in a 
three-to-four-day time frame, and was left alone to do so until the four days had lapsed. 
Even after that time, any supervision by respondent was minimal: weekly, at the most. 
He made suggestions for additional work to which Mr. Warburton consented. He hired 
his own labor to assist him in completing the project. Only when he failed to complete 
the project within the agreed budget and in a timely manner did respondent terminate the 
working relationship and order him off the job site. The record provides substantial 
evidence for the findings supporting the Commission's conclusion that respondent did not 
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exert sufficient control over petitioner's activities to overcome his status as an 
independent contractor 
Both the ALJ and the Commission observed that petitioner used his own tools and 
si ipplies in his work on the project. The ALJ stated, "Petitioner used his ow n truck and 
tools to repair 1:1 le i et ital i it iits[. ]M R 128, at id 1:1 le Coi nmission notcu .n«i. • \ . » m s 
began working on the apartments using 1 lis ow n ti i K k ai id to DIS. , ii ic Ii iding his air 
compressor for sandblasting." R 186. While acknowledging this-finding, petitioner 
further staler ..,a; K^pouJ^n; . puiciuL->cw pains . iui vJeanin^ ^ p p l n - s for Petitioner to use 
andalsi ' « L...II-.*,: 
provision of incidental supplies and the use of a trailer are not incompatible with the fact 
that petitioner "had his own tools and he had a job to be done." R ^ 01 at 1 -10 ? Tn fact, 
I1 In ' \ 'in! IUI i n n f o o l p n i r h i iiial< i M I K ill-ii i K M i n i m i \ i i i o l n u i i M ibe s e c u r e : 
*ka\ \ . *u said Mark told you to store your tools in the garage-
Was that a condition of the work or was it because he just didn't want your 
tools to be stolen 
Veil. [ >l .in was because of the problems, the vandal ism and stuff 
?• a ah.u ' ; i : . ! i i >olo would come back and ievandal i /e diose 
apartments again. 
Q But you testified Mark was y oi ir ft iei id? 
A Yes. 
Q I assumed he didn't want your tools to get stolen? 
A R ight 
I I I HI '" ' '",l In \ lii aipphes, [itlilioiiei s ow n hearing exhibits evidence that he 
purchased most of the supplies foi i ise ot 11:1: le pi oject S'< u " R 76 80 (listing < :ost of 
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"materials and supplies" for the project); 82 (listing "personal items used for job"); 
83-115 ("time sheets" that include receipts for purchases). The fact that he furnished the 
supplies is further evidenced by his subsequent filing of a mechanic's lien, in part, for 
materials. R. 122. 
F. Miscellaneous Factors 
The mechanic's lien petitioner filed against the rental property on January 12, 
2006, is additional evidence that even petitioner considered himself an independent 
contractor, not an employee. In the notice of lien, petitioner states, under oath that he 
supplied "LABOR FOR REPAIRS, IMPROVEMENTS AND MATERIALS on [and 
after] NOVEMBER 22, 2005." R. 122. This claim is inconsistent with employee status. 
While neither the ALJ nor the Commission based its decision on this fact, it provides 
additional support for the conclusion that petitioner acted as an independent contractor 
and is an additional basis on which the Court can affirm the Commission's decision: 
[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed 
from "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the 
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though 
such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not 
raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower 
court. " 
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ] 18, 29 P.3d 1225. 
Petitioner's reference to an alleged determination by the United States Internal 
Revenue Service that he was an employee, not an independent contractor, carries little 
weight. The record contains no testimony or other evidence showing how the IRS 
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determination was reached, and there is no indication that the process involved 
information provided by both petitioner and Mr \ dams. Nor is there any discussion of 
• I.K'lm , thai 11 if IkStkvim J n i \ Jill lr .1 , .1- r.i<ih< . Ii< "< llio'i " lailois iinght iclate 
to the factors relevant under Utah law. Moreover, the alleged "determination" does not 
appear in the record Finally, although petitioner claims that the IRS required respondent 
to issue a vV 2 tax form instead of a Form 1Q99, there is i 10 VV 2 of i ecord, and the F'orm 
petitioner's scant reference to the IRS determination is equivocal at best. 
In light of these miscellaneous factors, as well as petitioner's use of his own tools 
and sttpplirv, 1111". tiL'lil In i 'uiii'ini! Ilic malum ill IIIIIK In tin woik was perlnrmed, llie 
absence of substantial oversight by respondent, the lump sum budget for the project, and 
the fact that the woik v- .^ no! <: pail or process in respondent Adams1 trade or business, 
the Comi i lissioi i"s si ibstai itiall) suppoi ted : - 'ings susta,,. \\ .;oncu.Mon ma! petitioner 
was an independent contractor. F or ibesr *-r »-..-, 
entitled to workers1 compensation benefits for In injuries is within the limits of 
reasonableness and rationality, warranting Unh \ - *uii*>. aiiumance. 
ANY WORkiNu K L I , vTIONSHIP BETWEEN" l>iiIi 110NER 
AND RESPONDENT ADAMS WAS SEVERED BEFORE PETITIONER 
SIJSTAINED HIS INJURY 
Even if petitioner were found to be respondent Adams' employee, any working 
sustained his alleged MI -><y. iv. I J I , i6 / u.^. while conceding tl lat he and respondei it 
Adams "had a falling out" on December 23, 2005, petitioner asserts that he continued to 
work on the day of his injury, December 26, the same date on which he returned to the 
work site to pick up his air compressor. Aplt. Brief at 22. He argues that the action of 
retrieving his air compressor constituted a retrieval of his personal effects that should 
extend the employer's liability for workers1 compensation benefits past the exact time of 
termination, although he admits that there is no Utah case law on point. He urges the 
Court to implement a policy extending compensation to post-termination activities 
necessary to the orderly termination of the employment relationship. However, petitioner 
cannot prevail for three reasons. First, the Commission's decision falls within the limits 
of reasonableness and rationality, and the underlying findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence. Second, petitioner did not raise this issue until his petition for 
review of the ALJ's decision by the Commission. His "failure to raise the claim at the 
original hearing precludes any review on appeal." Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 860 
P.2d 960, 963 n.2 (Utah App. 1993). Third, each of the cases petitioner cites in support 
of this proposition is readily distinguishable. 
In Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105, 259 P.2d 547 ( 1953), an 
employee was killed when the roof of a loading platform collapsed and the material it 
supported fell on the employee and crushed him while he was eating his lunch in the 
shade it provided. The platform had undergone a temporary repair about 50 minutes 
before the lunch period, "at which time the employees were told not to return in the 
afternoon for work but to return the following morning, giving time to repair the 
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platform..'1 259 P.2d at 548. Even though the work for the day "had unexpectedly come 
to an end at the nooi. b-nnr," id, the court concluded that the death was compensable. 
"Unquestionably in the instant case compensation would hav e been payable had it been 
contemplated that the employee would resume his employment after the lunch period, 
1!,i ;,|"i. ' hat differ ei ice si 101 ild it i nake that there was to be a cessation of work wni M*. 
following morning?" Id. at 550. I h llike tl ic ei t iployee's job ii i Nicln ilson, petitionei fs 
working relationship with respondent Adams had been severed days before he was 
injured. 
S. " it - •  7: •  • - V i / ii h • m ? s. 8 8 9 I ," 2< ill II2 79 (01 h 9 1 ) h ; s ;ii nil; u I > 
Nicholson in mis relevant aspect. The employee worked at tiie hospital as a licensed 
practical nurse and had not been separated from employment at the time she was injured. 
the workplace to pick up h«M pavcheck and accomplish other errands." 889 P.2d at 1279. 
The court found the injur) compensable * -, - ng that ff[a]fter surveying the resolution of 
tl lis issi le, it becoi lies clear tl le autl: 101 it) n t tl le ai ea is di/v ersc, if i i.ot splintered[,]" id at 
1281, the court limited its decision affording coverage for tl i :: ii i \\ nit \ to tl ie facts of tl ic 
case... The court further observed, that the rule articulated in Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation I ,iw, J>WK mp an employee "in the course of en iployment while collecting 
by the statement that the contract of employment is not fully terminated until the 
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employee is paid." Id. Given that respondent Adams had paid petitioner all the money he 
believed petitioner was due on December 6, 2005, the rationale underlying the rule cited 
in St. Anthony Hospital is not applicable here. 
Although petitioner contends that his case is remarkably similar to Herman v. 
Sherwood Industries, Inc., 244 Conn. 502, 710 A.2d 1338 (1998), the facts show the 
contrary. The claimant in that case was terminated from employment and, on the same 
day, 
attended a termination meeting at Sherwood's personnel office. At that 
meeting, Sherwoodfs personnel officer conducted an exit interview and gave 
the claimant a layoff slip and a copy of an exit interview check list. Also at 
the termination meeting, the personnel officer informed the claimant that he 
could retrieve his personal tool box from the Sherwood loading dock, where 
it had been placed by Sherwood's foreman. Thereafter, in order to retrieve 
his tool box, the claimant was escorted from the personnel office to the 
loading dock, 
where he was injured. 710 A.2d at 1339. Although the court ruled that "a claimant is 
entitled to workers1 compensation for an injury that was incurred while leaving the job 
site immediately after the termination of his or her employment[,]" id. at 1341, it staled 
that "[t]he facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of 
whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to 
the job site." Id. at 1341 n.8. 
Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1975), is likewise distinguishable. In Nails, a mechanic who was terminated from 
employment was injured when he "returned to the job two days after being discharged to 
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pick up his tools , which he was required to furnish as a condition of his employment ." 
347 A.2d. at 567. The court permitted compensabi l i ty on the ground that "it was 
• ::i istoi i lai ) to allow ei i iplo> ees tw o oi tl iree day s to remove tl leii tools." 1 < i I lowever , the 
court noted that "If! here is responsible millioul1 lo llir . i>nluiv| ,|" .i ',k now !<„% ignijj,, dial 
"whether an accident causiim an injury to ;tn employee results from some obligation, 
condn--»-i ? MUiien. .*! the employment depends on the circumstances o f each particular 
case " l / I c titioi v :a 1 la s pointed t : it IC en ist :)i :t I • : i pi actic e b) r espoi ident A dan is of 
permitting a delayed retrieval of tools from the job site when a project is completed. 
Finally, petitioner asserts that there was evidence showing that he was still 
; - * ' C l i i : ; . . . • *..* CMC ^ ' 
the injury, and contends that there is no independent d o c u m e n t ? • 4 " = - * z 
contrary. Whi le accusing respondent of "inherently self s e n mg" a id ' S u s p v f 
(" Minion ; ilul llie working relationship was severed m, December 2 3 , 2005 , Aplt. Brief at 
22 , petit ioner fails to iveoj'.m/e lhal III*' e v i d n n v he nfos In show s n vices lendeivd on 
December 26 , his own test imony and the work summaries he generated, are equally self-
serving and suspect. It was the Commiss ion 's role to choose be tween equally 
• ausiblr m i iphiii ihlt* \ic\\ ul iho e\ Mono M I I U I U lh;i Iliri l mill n i l l n i m i l m n 
"even though w e may have come to a different conclusion had the case c o m e before us 
for de novo review." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 . 
>i d, as a \ v 1 10k , coi itaii is substai itial evidence supporting the findings 
underlyine the Commission's cone h lsioi i tl iiat am: o working relatioi iship betw eei I petitioi ler 
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and respondent Adams had ended before the date of petitionees alleged injury, December 
26, 2005. The Commission's choice to believe respondent Adams1 testimony over 
petitioner's was a legitimate view of the evidence. Given the record support for the 
Commission's ruling on this point, there are no grounds for reversal of its determination 
that petitioner would not have been entitled to workers' compensation benefits even if he 
had been respondent Adams' employee. 
III. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT ENTITLE PETITIONER TO 
BENEFITS WHERE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner briefly argues that he is entitled to compensation because "disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised 
from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the claim." Aplt. Brief at 25. In support, 
he provides, without analysis, a string of citations to cases decided from 1919 to 1990. 
He ignores this Court's decision in Strate v. Labor Commission, 2006 UT App 179, 136 
P.3d 1273, rejecting the application of liberal construction where the record supports the 
Commission's conclusion. Id. at \ 26. To accept petitioner's argument would be to 
deprive the Commission of its broad grant of discretion in matters involving workers' 
compensation, subject only to scrutiny for reasonableness and rationality. Gates, 2002 
UT App 428 at *1 . Liberal construction cannot save petitioner's case in light of the 
substantial evidence for the findings that support the Commission's decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
I he Commission drew two conclusions from, its findings of fact: that petitioner 
relationship between the two had terminated before the date of petitioner's iiijm v. 
Petitioner's failure to marshal the substantial evidence supporting the underlying findings 
r-.:n. a .suinctcnt D a ^ io uiinn; VUL t ,;IM..,ISSK)|I - coi iclusioi is. But even it the 
Court chooses to read i. the i i lei its of petitioi lei "s ::laii t is, tl le • z < - idence of recoi d shov s tl lat 
the Commission's decision Jail v iiliir. tiic limiL of reasonableness and rationality. For 
this reason, it warrants the Coi ill's affirmance. 
S l A l h M h M KiAjAKUJMii UKAi. A K K I U M I U N T 
Respondent Uninsured Lmplmeib fund believes the iav vo\ turning the issues in 
this case is well settled and that oral aruuinenf is not necessary to a proper decision. 
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